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suggests that policies promoting local investment, competition, and education
may sometimes be alternatives to direct controls and requirements.
Magnus BlomstrOm An Kokko
Stockholm School of Economics Stockholm School of Economics
P.O. Box 6501 P.O. Box 6501
113 83 Stockholm 113 83 Stockholm
SWEDEN SWEDEN
and NBERPolicies to Encourage Inflows of Technology through Foreign Multinationals1
Magnus Blomström and Art Kokko
1.Introduction
The debate on the role of government policies for economic perfonnance has,
in recent years, turned from discussing the choice between free markets and
government intervention to asking what types of intervention are good and bad.
One reason is that almost all governments, irrespective of their political
orientation, have chosen to play an active role in their economy (see e.g.
Bardhan, 1990). However, the definition of successful intervention is still
disputed, although an important lesson from the recent experience of several
Asian economies seems to be that governments should make use of market
forces in their efforts to influence the direction and character of economic
growth: markets and competition need to be retained to discourage wasteful
use of resources and to encourage learning and technical advances.
The distinction between good and bad intervention has been noted also
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in the trade policy debate. For instance, Bhagwati (1988) argues that policies
based on prescriptions rather than proscriptions generally produce better
economic performance. One reason is that the latter types of intervention tend
to stifle initiative and hurt entrepreneurship and growth, whereas the former
leave large areas untouched and also allow people to do what is not formally
prescribed. Another reason is that proscriptions tend to divert resources into
unproductive efforts to evade the rules.
A similar discussion is now emerging in the literature on foreign direct
investment (FDI) and technology transfer. Some of the main host country
benefits of FDI are considered to stem from the inflows of new technology to
affiliates of multinational firms (MNCs), since these flows create a potential
for technology spillovers to the host country's local firms (Blomström, 1989;
Kokko, forthcoming). What policy measures should host countries adopt to get
the MNCs to transfer more technology, and to increase the potential for
spillovers? The traditional view has been that different types of regulations are
necessary. Many governments have therefore started to frame the environment
within which multinationals operate by introducing various performance
requirements for their behavior. Special attention has been given to policies
regarding technology transfer, and a number of measures intended to
encourage or force multinational firms to increase their technology transfer
have been introduced over the years, including requirements for local content
and local R&D.3
A different view on how to influence the multinationals' technology
transfer has recently been suggested by Wang and Blomström (1992). They
develop a model where the MNC affiliate's decision to import technology is
explicitly related to profit maximization, i.e. the affiliate imports technology
until the marginal revenue of further import is equal to the marginal cost.
Technology imports raise revenue (although at a diminishing rate) because the
demand for MNC products is positively related to the technological gap
between the affiliate and competing host country firms. However, there are
also costs involved in each transfer operation (e.g. for training of local
workers), and more modern technologies are increasingly more expensive to
transfer.
The model's implications for host country policies match those from the
recent debate on government intervention in the trade literature. One result is
that requirements which increase the affiliates' technology transfer costs may
have perverse effects, i.e. reduce technology imports, unless there are strong
sanctions for those who do not abide by the rules. Another conclusion, pointed
out by Wang and Blomström (1992), is that host country governments might
increase the transfer of technology through foreign affiliates by making sure
that they are exposed to local competition and by supporting domestic firms
in their efforts to learn from the foreigners. Increased competitiveness in local
firms means that the technology gap becomes narrower, which reduces the
demand for the affiliates' products and gives them a reason to bring in new4
technology in order to restore their advantages. Analogously, government
intervention that reduces the affiliates' transfer costs, e.g. education policies
that raise the host countries' learning capabilities and improve local labor
skills, may encourage higher technology imports. In other words, policies
making use of market forces may be preferable to intervention in the form of
conventional technology transfer and perfonnance requirements.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no host government that has
methodically tried to encourage foreign affiliates to import technology by using
competition and education policies instead of formal requirements, so it is not
possible to compare the effects of the various types of policy intervention.
However, there is a large variation in requirements, competition, education,
and other characteristics across host countries, and it should be possible to
observe systematic cross-country differences in the affiliates' technology
imports if these characteristics influence the marginal costs and benefits of
technology transfer, as hypothesized intheWang-Blomström model. In this
paper, we will therefore examine how the technology imports of U.S.
majority-owned foreign affiliates in 33 host countries are related to proxies for
the host countries' requirements, levels of local competition, and learning
capabilities. The results are intended to provide some insights about how host
countries can persuade foreign-owned multinationals to bring more technology
to their affiliates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents data, variables,5
and statistical hypotheses. Section 3 reports the statistical results and Section
4 summarizes and concludes the paper.
2.Data, Variables, and Statistical Hypotheses
A. Dependent Variables: Measures of Parent-Affiliate Technology Transfers
The transfer of the parent MNC's proprietary technology can take different
forms, including technical documentation, education and training of the
affiliate's labor force, exchanges of technical personnel, shipments of
machinery and equipment, and continuing communication to solve whatever
problems occur in the production processes. Each transfer is likely to include
several of these modes; yet, only a few of the transfer forms are usually
recorded. Moreover, there are reasons to be cautious even when data are
available. One problem is that all parent companies have not developed precise
methods for pricing the technology that is supplied to affiliates. Another
complication has to do with transfer pricing: mtra-corporate technology
payments are likely instruments for concealing repatriated profits and evading
host country taxes, because market prices for the technologies are usually
lacking (see e.g. Caves, 1982).
The data on technology transfers used in this study are from the U.S.
Department of Commerce surveys of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, and refer
to the manufacturing operations of majority-owned foreign affiliates (MOFAs)
of U.S. multinationals in 33 host countries in 1982 (U. S. Department of6
Commerce, 1985).! We will define several alternative proxies for the
affiliates technology imports, based on data for the U.S. MOFAs total
payments for royalties and license fees, and their imports of capital equipment
from the United States. In addition to the possible data problems mentioned
above, two additional sources of errors should be noted. The data on the
affiliates' royalties and license payments include payments to non-affiliated
persons (although intra-MNCs transactions make up 93 per cent of the total
payments), and imports from all U.S. sources are included in the data on
capital equipment. The proxies therefore refer to the affiliates' technology
imports from all sources rather than to transfers between parents and affiliates.
The total value of the payments for royalties and licenses in 1982 by
U.S. MOFAs in the manufacturing sector amounted to 3,051 million U.S.
dollars. Out of this, 2,856 million dollars were accounted for by affiliates in
developed countries, and only 195 million by affiliates in developing countries.
In the same year, 1,358 million dollars worth of capital equipment was
exported from the U.S. to the affiliates, with 874 million going to developed
country affiliates and 484 million to the developing countries. Table I presents
some measures of the royalty and license payments (LICENSE) and imports
of capital equipment (CAPIMP) by U.S. MOFAs operating in different
industry groups in 1982.7
Insert Table 1
It can be seen that the differences between industries are very large for
the LICENSE variables: the payments range from 90 dollars per employee (or
a tenth of a per cent of the value of sales) in transport equipment to 2,890
dollars per employee (or over three per cent of sales) in machinery. The
variation in equipment imports is smaller, but still notable.
The cross-country data that we will use for the regression analysis are
only available for total manufacturing, because numerous industry level
observations have been suppressed at the source for reasons of confidentiality.
However, the large inter-industry differences illustrated by Table 1 suggest that
the industry distribution of affiliates may show through in the figures for total
manufacturing. For example, in Sweden, most U.S. investment is in
machinery, which clearly is the most "licensing-intensive" industry group, and
technology payments can be expected to be high for this reason alone. It is
even possible that the industry effects dominate other explanations for
cross-country differences in technology imports. To come around this problem,
we have therefore constructed some alternatives to the simple LICENSE
measure.
The first of these, termed LICDIF, attempts to measure the difference8
between actual license payments and what we might "expect" on the basis of
the industry distribution of U.S. MOFAs in each host country. The measure
is constructed using data on average license payments per employee (weighted
by employment shares, from Table 1) and employment data for U.S. affiliates
(from U.S. Department of Commerce, 1985).2 To get a measure of expected
license payments for each country/industry group, we multiplied the affiliates'
employment in each industry in each country by the average license payment
for that industry. An estimate of the total expected license payment for each
host country, taking into account its industry distribution of affiliates, was then
obtained by summing across industries for each country. To get the variable,
LICDIF, fmally, we subtracted these estimates from the actual license
payments of the host country. Contrary to the ratio of actual license payments
to labor, LICDIF is not automatically high if a large share of the country's
affiliates are in "licensing-intensive" industries, since the expected license
payment in that case is also high. Instead, LICDIF is hypothesized to be high
only when the affiliates import more technology than what is "normal".
Measures for CAPDIF, the difference between actual and expected imports of
capital equipment, were calculated analogously.
The differences between developed and developing countries, in
particular for payments of royalties and license fees, are also strikingly large,
as noted above. Differences in industry distribution explain part of this, but
there may be other factors that depress the technology flows to developing9
countries. These include the weaker learning capability of developing
countries, weak infrastructure, fragmented markets, political instability, and
a host of other matters that we have no comprehensive data for. For some of
the tests, we have therefore recalculated the dependent variables with separate
expectations for developed and developing countries -inother words, the
measures for expected license payments from developing countries have been
based on average license payments from developing countries only. The
resulting variables, which are corrected both for the industry distribution and
development level, are termed LICDIF* and CAPDIF*, and allow us to
concentrate more directly on the effects of the host country characteristics we
have data for. All of the measures have been scaled in two ways, i.e. divided
by the affiliates' sales and by their employment, to provide several alternative
proxies for technological effort. The six versions of the dependent variable are
summarized in Appendix Table i.3
B. Explanatory Variables: Requirements, Local C'ompetition, and Learning
Capability.
Levels of economic development, political stability, technology transfer
requirements, local competition, learning capability, and a host of other
characteristics are likely to vary across host countries. We hypothesized in the
introduction that it should be possible to observe systematic cross-country
differences in the MNC affiliates' technology imports if these host country10
characteristics influence the marginal costs and benefits of technology transfer,
as argued by Wang and Blomström (1992). Since most of these features are
difficult to measure empirically, we have restricted our analysis to proxies for
three variables -technologytransfer and performance requirements, local
competition, and local learning capability -buteven these suffer from some
obvious weaknesses.4
First, to measure the host countries' technology transfer and
performance requirements, we have calculated two proxies from U.S.
Department of Commerce (1985), Table 11.1.3. The first of these, labelled
TREQS, focuses directly on technology transfer requirements, and measures
the share of U.S. affiliates in each host country in 1982 that were reported to
operate under requirements to use the most advanced technology available,
perform R&D locally, have access to the U.S. parent's patents, or transfer
skills to local personnel. We hypothesize that these requirements increase the
affiliates' technology transfer costs, and we therefore expect TREQS to have
a negative impact on the affiliates' imports of technology. However, the impact
may not be very significant, for two reasons. Although the requirements
captured by TREQS are likely to increase transfer costs, it is possible that
there are some cases where they are backed up by strong sanctions, so that
only the firms that actually transfer much technology are allowed to stay in
operation. Secondly, the effects of the requirements on both transfer costs and
actual transfers may sometimes be insignificant, because many of the rules are11
ambiguous: the affiliate decides which technologies are viable, there may not
be any direct connection between R&D and imports of new technology, and
access to the parent's patents does not ensure actual transfer of technology.
The alternative proxy PREQS reflects the share of affiliates that faced
various quantitative performance requirements in 1982 (including import
restrictions, minimum local content, and minimum local employment
requirements). This may be more suitable for present purposes, because
quantitative rules are less ambiguous and easier to uphold, and because the
performance requirements that increase the extent of local participation also
increase the costs of transferring and using advanced technologies. Hence, we
hypothesize that PREQS will have a negative impact on technology transfer.
Both TREQS and PREQS cover all non-bank affiliates of U.S. parents
with more than 10 per cent U.S. ownership, rather than only the
majority-owned affiliates included in the measures of technology imports. The
general pattern, with OECD countries and some South-East Asian economies
registering the lowest formal requirements and Latin American and South
Asian nations exhibiting the highest ones, is the one we would expect also for
more comprehensive measures of technology transfer requirements.5
We have proxied local competition with two alternative measures of
investment intensity in the host economy. The assumption is that investment
reflects either new entrants into industry, or an upgrading of the technological
level of existing firms, both of which increase competition and reduce the12
technology gap between the affiliate and local firms. The variables are
INV/OUTPUT (the gross fixed capital formation/gross output ratio) and
INV/EMPL (gross fixed capital formation per employee) and both cover the
host countries' entire manufacturing sectors, excluding the U.S. affiliates.
They are based on data from various issues of the United Nations' Industrial
Statistics Yearbook, and for the INV/EMPL variable, capital formation figures
have been converted from local currency to U.S. dollars and corrected for
international differences in capital goods prices using data from Summers and
Heston (1988). Investment by multinationals from other countries than the
United States has not been subtracted, which means that "local competitors"
are defined as all non-U.S. actors in the host country market, including MNC
affiliates from other countries.6 INV/OUTPUT and INV/EMPL are used
interchangeably in the estimations: the variables provide alternative, although
related, measures of competition, as seen by the simple correlation of about
0.5 (see Appendix Table 2). The hypothesis from the theoretical model is that
local competition reduces the technology gap and the demand for the affiliates'
products, and increases the marginal revenue of further technology transfer.
Hence, we expect the affiliates' technology imports to be positively related to
our proxies for local competition.
To account for the cross-country differences in learning capabilities and
labor skills, we use the variables ED2ND and ED3RD. They measure the
share of the appropriate age-group in secondary and third level education in13
each host country 1980, and are taken from UNESCO's Statistical Yearbook
1990, Table 3.2. We expect both variables to have a positive influence on
the affiliates' technology imports, because the marginal technology transfer
costs are lower when the level of education is higher. However, it should be
noted already here that the small variance in ED2ND is likely to reduce its
observed significance.
3.Statistical Results
A. Payments for Royalties and License Fees by MNC Affiliates
The results of OLS estimations of the U.S. MOFAs' license payments are
reported in Table 2. The dependent variables in equations (1) and (2) are based
on the observed license payments (LICENSE), equations (3) and (4) refer to
variables that are adjusted for the industry distribution of affiliates (LICDIF),
and those in equations (5) and (6) have been adjusted also for the host
countries' development levels (LICDIF*).
Insert Table 2 here
Looking first at the estimations with LICENSE, we find that our proxies
for local competition and education are positively related to the affiliates'14
license payments, whereas the effect of requirements seems to be negative.
The coefficients for the two variants of the local competition proxy,
INV/EMPL and INV/OUTPUT, are both highly significant, but the former
performs better in terms of R2. This holds for the other equations as well, and
the reason is probably that INV/EMPL captures some of the differences
between the countries' capital intensities: high rates of gross investment per
employee are likely to be connected to high capital-labor ratios (simply
because much capital must be replaced in every period), and also to high levels
of technical skills that facilitate the affiliates' technology imports.
The coefficients for the requirement proxies TREQS and PREQS are
both negative, but TREQS is seldom significantly different from zero, and it
is therefore not shown in the table. This may suggest that the requirements
captured by TREQS may sometimes include rules that force the affiliates to
import technology irrespective of the costs, or that TREQS has little effect on
the affiliates' costs of importing technology, as discussed earlier. Both ED2ND
and ED3RD have the expected positive coefficients, but they are not highly
significant.
However, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from the results for
LICENSE, although they seem to confirm some of our hypotheses. As
discussed earlier, the cross-country differences in licensing intensity may be
caused mainly by differences in the industry distribution of affiliates, and not
by our explanatory variables. The observed effects of competition, education,15
and requirements may therefore be related to decisions about industry
localization rather than to the determinants of the affiliates' technology
imports.
In equations (3) and (4), an attempt has been made to account for the
cross-country differences in the industry distribution of affiliates. The
explanatory power of the equations improves somewhat, and the coefficient for
ED3RD becomes significant. However, INV/OUTPUT loses its significance.
A possible reason for this is that the license payments from developed and
developing countries differ so much that local competition alone, as proxied
by INV/OUTPUT, cannot explain the pattern. INV/EMPL contains some
information about capital-intensities, and may be more significant for that
reason.
The major result of the crude adjustment for development levels in the
variable LICDIF* is that INV/OUTPUT becomes more efficient, whereas the
estimated coefficients of PREQS and ED3RD become less significant, although
their signs remain as expected. In equation (5),thecoefficient of INV/EMPL
is significant at the one per cent level, whereas those for PREQS and ED3RD
are not significantly different from zero. In equation (6), the coefficient of the
alternative competition proxy INV/OUTPUT is significant at the five per cent
level, but the confidence levels for requirements and education are below 10
per cent. The reason why the proxies for education and requirements are not
significant in these two equations is probably that their effects have already16
been captured by the adjustment for development levels in the dependent
variable.
Summing up these results, there is fair support for the hypotheses that
the affiliates' technology payments are positively related to the host countries'
domestic investment levels and education levels, but negatively related to
various performance requirements.
B. Imports of Capital Equipment by MNC Affiliates
Before discussing the determinants of the affiliates' capital imports, it is
necessary to make some comments on the relation between imports of capital
equipment and technology transfer in general. The reason is that there may be
some substitution between different modes of technology transfer. For
instance, we hypothesize that higher teaming capability and labor quality in the
host country are accompanied by larger transfers of technology to affiliates,
but the technology flows may not take the form of capital goods imports. In
countries with high levels of education, it may be possible to find local
suppliers of advanced machinery and equipment -theneeded machine
technology can probably be imported in the form of blueprints -andCAPIMP
may remain low although technology transfers in general are large. In the less
developed countries, on the other hand, levels of education are low, but
CAPIMP may be relatively high anyway because all advanced machinery may
have to be imported. Similarly, shortages of skilled labor might lead17
developing country affiliates to choose technologies that are embodied in
capital goods, rather than "soft' technologies that require skilled labor. This
suggests a more complex case, with several effects pulling in different
directions. The estimations may therefore be seen as tests of which of these
effects are the strongest.
There are question marks also concerning the effects of requirements.
Most technology transfer requirements usually aim to control the transfer of
disembodied technology, e.g. by demanding special training of the local labor
force, whereas performance requirements are often initiated to reach some
target level of local content or to restrict imports of intermediary goods for
macro-economic reasons. It is not certain that these rules have major effects
on imports of machinery and equipment. In fact, if requirements are strong
(and increase the cost to transfer soft technologies) they might even lead
affiliates to prefer to transfer embodied technology, because it is less likely to
spill over to local competitors.
Table 3 presents some of the estimations for imports of capital
equipment by U.S. MOFAs. The dependent variable in equations (7) and (8)
is based on the directly observable data for the affiliates' imports of capital
equipment (CAPIMP), but has been adjusted for the industry mix of the
affiliates operating in the host country in equation (9) (CAPDIF), and also for
the host country's development level in equation (10) (CAPDIF*). The results
are weaker than those for the license measures -mostnotably, R2 is18
significantly lower -butthe positive coefficient of local investment remains
significant at the 10 per cent level for all variants of the equation. The
coefficient of PREQS is also positive in all estimations, although never
significant. The signs of the coefficients of TREQS and the education proxies
vary, but none of them is significantly different from zero.
Insert Table 3
Thus, there is some evidence that investment by local competitors may
force the affiliates to higher imports of technology that is embodied in capital
goods. The costs posed by the host countries' performance and technology
transfer requirements do not seem to discourage imports of capital equipment
-ifanything, there is a slight positive effect of requirements, that perhaps
reflects the preference to import more embodied technology when the costs for
other transfer modes are high -anddifferences in the level of education do not
have any detenninate effect. However, the weak fit of the model suggests that
there are other important determinants of capital equipment imports than those
included in the model.
We also tested the hypotheses for a dependent variable constructed as
the sum of CAPIMP and LICENSE, to examine how the differences in the19
"aggregate" technology imports of U.S. affiliates can be explained. The
estimated equation (for the 31 countries where data were available), with the
dependent variable Y defined as the ratio (CAPIMP +LICENSE)ILABOR,
and with t-statistics in parentheses, is
(11) Y =-0.07 + 1.00INV/EMPL -0.32 PREQS +0.38ED3RD
(0.18)(4.72)*** (2.22)** (1.50)
It can be seen that the impact of local competition (as measured by
INV/EMPL) appears to be even more significant here than in any of the other
estimations. The negative coefficient of PREQS is also significant, but that of
ED3RD is not, although it has the expected positive sign. Moreover, there are
notable improvements in the overall fit of the equation: R2 increases to 0.55,
and the F-value to 13.47.
4.Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper has been to determine whether host countries aiming
to maximize the inflows of technology through foreign multinationals have
viable policy alternatives to formal technology transfer requirements. On the
basis of a simple theoretical model of technology transfer, proposed by Wang
and Blomström (1992), we hypothesized that policies making use of market
forces may be more effective than conventional technology transfer20
requirements. For instance, policies increasing the level of competition in the
host country may erode the MNC affiliate's technological advantages, and
force it to import new technology from its parent. Similarly, policies
improving local learning capability and labor skills may reduce technology
transfer costs, and encourage imports of technology.
To test these hypotheses, we examined how cross-country differences
in the technology imports of U.S. affiliates in 33 host countries (calculated
from data on the affiliates' payments for royalties and license fees and their
imports of capital equipment from the U.S. in 1982) were related to proxies
for technology transfer requirements, local competition, and labor skills in the
host countries. The results consistently showed that the technology imports of
MNC affiliates increased with our proxies for the competitive pressure in the
host economy. The technology transfers that were reflected by data on
payments of royalties and license fees were negatively related to performance
requirements, but the requirements did not have any clear effect on imports of
technologies embodied in machinery and equipment. Moreover, the host
countries' levels of education had a positive impact on the affiliates' payments
of royalties and license fees, but no significant effect on the affiliates' imports
of capital equipment.
One policy conclusion of these fmdings is that host country governments
may choose to support local investment, competition, and education rather than
to rely on controls and direct supervision of FDI to secure inflows of21
technology to the affiliates of foreign MNCs. One problem, of course, is that
some of these policies -especiallythose that promote competition -maybe
contrary to measures that are commonly used by host countries to attract new
MNCs, e.g. import protection. In practice, it may therefore be necessary to
weigh the benefits from larger inflows of technology to already present MNC
affiliates against the possible costs in terms of foregone new investment from
abroad.22
Notes
1. The surveys cover affiliates in about 50 individual countries, and the data
are presented for aggregate manufacturing and seven broad industry groups.
Gaps in the data have forced us to exclude many countries, and those
remaining are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
Denmark, Ecuador, France, West Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India,
Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South
Korea, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, U.K., and Venezuela. Some estimations cover
fewer countries because of missing observations.
2. It was not possible to calculate unweighted average license payments
because of the many missing country/industry observations.
3. Technology transfers could also be proxied with data on the affiliates' R&D
expenditures, since local R&D often require imports of technology from the
parent company. However, the size and income level of the host economy are
probably the only host characteristics that influence this proxy, as discussed
by Zejan (1990), and we have therefore not included any R&D variables.
4. Some other factors influencing technology transfers have been discussed in
the literature. For instance, Katrak (1991) notes that affiliates are likely to use
more capital-intensive technologies if there are minimum-wage laws that cause
wage rates to exceed some market equilibrium rate, or if over-valued exchange
rates subsidize the use of imported equipment and intennediaries. We have not
included these factors in the analysis for lack of appropriate data.
5. The well-known Decision 24 of the Andean Investment Code, instituted in
1970/71, prohibited payments of royalties and license fees from wholly-owned
affiliates to parents. If the rule had been implemented strictly, the variable
LICENSE would, per definition, have been equal to zero for Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. However, the number of exceptions
has been large, and there did not seem to be any significant differences in the
use of royalties and license fees between these countries and the rest of Latin
America in the early 1980s. See Grosse (1989), pp. 113-131.
6. Our results may therefore reflect the international competition between
MNCs from different countries. See e.g. Graham (1991) and Sölvell (1987).
7. ED2ND and ED3RD refer to 1980, since data for 1982 were not available
for all countries.23
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Table 1 Measures of U.S. Majority-OwnedForeign Affiliates' (MOFAs)
Payments of Royalties and License Fees and Imports of Capital




Food products 0.0049 450 0.0020 183
Chemical products 0.0133 1,504 0.0018 197
Metal products 0.0049 334 0.0057 388
Machinery 0.0315 2,890 0.0106 969
Electric equipment 0.0087 390 0.0055 246
Transport equipment 0.0009 90 0.0058 574
Other manufacturing 0.0118 761 0.0047 300
Total manufacturing 0.0113 909 0.0050 405
Total manufacturing,
developed countries 0.0130 1,234 0.0040 378
Total manufacturing,
developing countries 0.0038 187 0.0095 464
Source: Calculated from U.S. Department of Commerce (1985), Tables
uI.D.3, III.F.3, III.G.14, and III.H.12.25
Table2 Results of OLS Estimations. Payments of Royalties and License
Fees by Affiliates 1982.
INV/ INV/
EquationConstantEMPL OUTPUT PREQS ED3RDR2 F N
LICENSE/LABOR
(1) 0.0907 0.9446 -- -0.5075 0.65360.445 9.5533
(0.161) (3099)11*-- (2.575)**(1.695)
LICENSE/SALES
(2) 0.2016 -- 0.9250-0.5444 0.41780.348 6.5132
(0.402) -- (2.587)1*(3.140)1*1 (1375)
LICDIF/LABOR
(3) 0.2058 0.6335 -- -0.3392 0.49990.477 10.71 33
(0.559) (3.178)***-- (2.632)**(1.982)
LICDIF/SALES
(4) 0.7743 -- 0.1610-0.1512 0.21580.382 7.4032
(5.080)1*1-- (1.481) (2.869)*** (2.336)1*
LICDIF*/LABOR
(5) 0.4102 0.4630 -- -0.0995 0.22630.252 4.5933
(1.372) (2.858)1*1 — (0.950) (1.104)
LICDIF1/SALES
(6) 0.4758 -- 0.4249-0.1364 0.23560.223 3.9632
(1.971)1 (2.468)1*(1.634) (1.611)
Notes: All variables appearing in the regression equations are scaled by division with the sample
means. Estimated coefficients are shown together with the absolute value of the t-statistic in
parentheses. 1',I', andIIIindicatesignificance at the 10, 5, and I per cent levels of confidence
(two-tailed tests). For definitions of variables and data sources, see Appendix Table 1.26
Table 3 Results of OLS Estimations. Imports of Capital Equipment from
the United States by Affiliates 1982.
INV/ INVI
EquationConstantEMPL OUTPUT PREQS ED3RDR2F N
CAPIMP/LABOR
(7) 0.1514 0.6329-- 0.1867 0.02890.081 1.88 31
(0.288) (2.154)**-- (0.947) (0.081)
CAPIMP/SALES
(8) 0.3995 — 0.9594 0.0566 -0.41540.0841.88 30
(0.558) -- (1.840)*(0.214) (0.979)
CAPDIF/LABOR
(9) 0.2277 0.5391 -- 0.2623 -0.02910.0821.90 31
(0.453) (1.919)*-- (1.391) (0.086)
CAPDIF*/LABOR
(10) 0.2393 0.5107-- 0.1407 0.10930.0341.35 31
(0.469) (1.792)*-- (0.736) (0.317)
Note: All variables appearing in the regression equations are scaled by division with the sample
means. Estimated coefficients are shown together with the absolute value of the t-statistic in
parentheses. , , and indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels of confidence
(two-tailed tests). For definitions of variables and data sources, see Appendix Table 1.27
Appendix Table 1 List of Variables and Data Sources
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: proxies for the technology imports of
U.S. MOFAs (Basic data are from U.S. Department of Commerce,
1985.)
LICENSE -paymentsof royalties and license fees to the U.S. by
U.S. MOFAs in host country i 1982.
LICDIF -differencebetween LICENSE and expected license
payments, defined for each country i as
LICENSE1 -E(LABOR1J *AVELICJ)
where LABOR1J is the employment in country i's industry
jandAVELICJ is the unweighted average license
payment per employee in industry j,ZLICENSEJ / E1
EMPLjJ.
LICDIF* -asLICDIF, but AVELIC calculated separately for
developed and developing countries.
CAPIMP -importsof capital equipment from the U.S. by U.S.
MOFAs in host country i 1982.
CAPDIF -differencebetween CAPIMP and expected imports of
capital equipment, calculated as LICDIF.
CAPDIF* -asCAPDIF, but average capital imports calculated
separately for developed and developing countries.
(continued...)28
Appendix Table 1 (continued...)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (Data sources in parentheses.)
INV/EMPL -grossfixed investment per employee in each host
country's manufacturing sector 1982 (excluding U.S.
MOFAs), corrected for international price differences for
capital goods. Proxy for local competition. (Industrial
Statistics Yearbook, various; Summers and Heston,
1988.)
INV/OUTPUT-ratioof gross fixed investment to gross output in each
host country's manufacturing sector 1982 (excluding U.S.
MOFAs). Proxy for local competition. (Industrial
Statistics Yearbook, various.)
TREQS -shareof U.S. affiliates in each host country facing
various technology transfer requirements 1982. (U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1985.)
PREQS -shareof U.S. affiliates in each host country facing
variousperformancerequirements1982.(U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1985.)
ED2ND -percent of age group (13-18) in secondary level
education 1980 in each host country. Proxy for labor
skills. (UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 1990.)
ED3RD -percent of age group (18-24) in third level education
1980 in each host country. Proxy for labor skills.
(UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 1990.)29




ED2ND 0.12 -0.33 1.00
ED3RD 0.20 -0.08 0.67 1.00
PREQS -0.04 0.36 -0.75 -0.39 1.00
TREQS -0.06 0.55 -0.64 -0.49 0.52 1.00
INVI INV/ ED2ND ED3RD PREQSTREQS
EMPL OUTPUT
Note:There are 33 observations for all variables except INV/OUTPUT
(N =32).For data sources and definitions of variables, see Appendix Table 1.